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Nature's Eldest Law: A Survey of a Nation's Right To Act in Self-Defense
RICHARD G. MAXON

From Parameters, Autumn 1995, pp. 55-68.
On 14 April 1993, Kuwaiti authorities uncovered an assassination plot against former US President George Bush.[1]
This plot was to be carried out against President Bush during a three-day visit to Kuwait. From an intensive twomonth investigation, the United States government determined that the explosive device contained features found only
in bombs made by groups linked to Iraq.[2] Further, public statements by the Saddam Hussein government following
the Gulf War claimed that Iraq would hunt down President Bush and punish him.[3] The United States concluded that
the Iraqi Intelligence Service had been ordered to carry out the attack on President Bush. On 26 June 1993, President
Clinton, claiming his actions were in self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, ordered the US
military to launch an attack on the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. Twenty-three cruise missiles were
fired, destroying the headquarters and killing six people.[4] An assassination attempt by a foreign government against
a former United States President: this was a clear case warranting a military response in self-defense. Or was it? The
answer to this question is not as clear as it initially may seem.
With the increase in terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, border disputes, and ethnic unrest, it is
becoming increasingly ambiguous when a nation may lawfully resort to the use of armed force for its self-defense and
the defense of other nations.[5] Article 51 of the United Nations Charter attempts to codify the circumstances in which
a nation may act in self-defense. Despite the express language of Article 51, much debate has taken place concerning
the meaning of this article, when the right to act in self-defense accrues, and, perhaps more important, when it ceases.
This article briefly reviews the customary international law concepts of a nation's right to resort to military force in its
self-defense. Next, self-defense under the United Nations Charter, and various arguments concerning its application,
are examined. Finally, the article suggests criteria to assist in the analysis of when the use of military force in selfdefense is lawfully justified.
Customary International Law
To understand the right of a nation to use military force in its own self defense, it is necessary to understand why this
right exists. The recognized purpose of self-defense is to deter aggression and to protect the interests of the state.[6] Its
goal is preventive in nature and not retributive.[7]
Seventeenth-century Spaniards believed that the right of self-defense was limited to the protection of territory. Other
writers of the day believed that the right extended to the violation of any national right.[8] Fault by the other party was
seen as a precondition to the legitimate exercise of the right of self- defense. Unfortunately, these early writers failed
to provide much guidance on the degree of injury or fault necessary to justify military action.[9]
Historically, states demanded a right of self-defense of considerable scope. Customary international law authorized a
state targeted by another state to employ military force as necessary to protect itself.[10] The law recognized, as a
minimum, the right of a state to act to protect against threats to its political independence or territorial integrity.[11]
The right to act in self-defense was not limited only to instances of actual armed attack. States were permitted to act
when the imminence of attack was of such a high degree that a nonviolent resolution of a dispute was precluded.[12]
The "Caroline" Case
The Caroline case is the most often cited precedent in the customary international law of self-defense. In 1837, during
the revolt in Canada against the British, a ship named the Caroline would periodically sail from US territory into
Canada. It would reinforce and resupply the rebels and then return to the United States. To put an end to this, British
forces entered the United States, seized the Caroline, and destroyed her, killing two US citizens.[13] Upon receiving a

protest from the United States, the British claimed they had acted lawfully in self-defense.
In an exchange of letters with the British government, Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined what he believed
were the conditions for a proper claim of self defense. Secretary Webster stated that there "must be a necessity of selfdefense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." He further argued that
the act should involve "nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act justified by the necessity of self-defense must
be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it."[14] While never admitting culpability, the British apologized to
the United States for the incident. Secretary Webster's Caroline criteria, described in the literature as those of
"necessity" and "proportionality," continue to form the basis for analysis of the right of self-defense.
"Necessity" is the most important precondition to the legitimate use of military force in self-defense. In determining
whether the use of military force is necessary, many factors must be carefully balanced. These factors include the
nature of the coercion being applied by the aggressor state, the aggressor state's relative size and power, the nature of
the aggressor's objectives, and the consequences if those objectives are achieved.[15] The target state makes the initial
determination of the necessity of using military force in self-defense.[16]
"Proportionality" is the "requirement that the use of force or coercion be limited in intensity and magnitude to what is
reasonably necessary promptly to secure the permissible objectives of self-defense."[17] Because the purpose of selfdefense is to preserve the status quo, proportionality requires that military action cease once the danger has been
eliminated.
Despite widespread reference to the Caroline factors, they have not been accepted without criticism. Many argue that
these criteria are too restrictive, having been written in an era when an enemy literally had to be massed on the border
to be a threat. With nuclear weapons and rapid delivery techniques, the requirement that no action be taken until "force
be overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation" is seen by some commentators as
unrealistic in today's world.[18] Nonetheless, the Caroline factors continue to be relied upon in the analysis of
potential self-defense situations.
When Does the Right of Self-Defense Arise?
The prerequisite to the lawful right to act in self-defense is an injury (violation of a legal obligation), inflicted or
threatened, by one state against a substantive right of another state.[19] It is generally accepted that military force may
be used to:
Protect a nation's political independence. Every state has a responsibility to respect the political independence
of every other state. Force may be used to protect such independence when it is threatened and all reasonably
available avenues of peaceful resolution have proved unavailing.
Protect a nation's territorial integrity. Each state has an inherent right to protect its national borders, airspace,
and territorial waters from acts of aggression.
Protect citizens and their property abroad. A state has a right to protect its citizens abroad if their lives are
placed in jeopardy and the host state is either unwilling or unable to provide the necessary protection.[20]
While these rights are widely acknowledged in the customary international law, they are not absolute. They must be
balanced against similar rights enjoyed by other states and the maintenance of peace in the international
community.[21] When, in the judgment of the injured state, the necessity of acting in self-defense outweighs any harm
such act imposes, it may lawfully resort to the use of military force.[22]
The United Nations Charter
Following World War II, the United Nations was created to, among other things, establish global order and provide a
forum in which international disputes may be resolved without the use of armed force. The United Nations Charter has
as a central theme the maintenance of peace and security between nations. Its aim is to substitute a community
response for unilateral action in deterring aggression.[23] Three objectives form the foundation of this order. They
include:

The maintenance of an orderly world that emphasizes cooperation among states.
A preference for change by peaceful processes rather than coercion.
The minimization of destruction.[24]
The United Nation Charter condemns aggression and requires the use of peaceful means to settle disputes. To facilitate
this process, the Charter establishes the Security Council, which is given the responsibility for maintaining
international peace. While preferring community action, the Charter also recognizes a state's inherent right to take
unilateral action in self defense.[25]
Self-Defense Under the United Nations Charter
The United Nations Charter recognizes the use of military force as lawful in only two instances, either as part of a
United Nations authorized military operation to restore the peace under Article 42 or for self-defense under Article
51.[26] Article 51 provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of the right of self defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Despite the seemingly clear language of this article, considerable controversy surrounds the extent to which a member
may take action in self-defense under the Charter. Many international law scholars argue that the customary
international law doctrine of self-defense, as developed from the Caroline case, survives under the Charter. These
scholars believe that the Charter was not intended to restrict the right of a nation to take defensive action in any
material way.[27]
Others argue that while the right to self-defense exists in the customary international law, each member of the United
Nations, by adopting the Charter, has waived its rights to those aspects of self-defense that are not specifically
permitted under Article 51.[28] They reason that the United Nations was established to create order and that reliance
on the customary international law would be counterproductive to that goal.[29] While the majority of the experts in
the field hold the opinion that the right of self-defense remains unimpaired under the Charter, this dispute remains
largely unresolved.
Anticipatory Self-Defense Under the United Nations Charter
The most intense debate concerning the right to act in self-defense under the Charter focuses on the right of a nation to
act in self-defense in anticipation of an armed attack. There is little question that before the Charter, a right to act in
self-defense, as recognized by the customary international law, included the right to act in anticipatory selfdefense.[30] Article 51 with its language "if an armed attack occurs," has been seen by some commentators as
restricting a nation's ability to lawfully invoke that right. Others believe no such limitation was intended and that the
right to act in anticipation of an attack remains intact. The main arguments of each position are briefly outlined below.
Restrictivist View. Critics of the customary right to engage in acts of anticipatory self-defense have been referred to as
belonging to the "restrictive school."[31] These critics believe that member states have only those rights affirmatively
granted by the Charter. One such right permits actions in self-defense only once an armed attack occurs. Two policy
considerations are advanced to support this position. First, determining whether an armed attack is imminent is
extremely difficult.[32] An error in calculation could lead a militarily powerful nation to start a war of massive
proportions based on the mistaken belief that it was about to be attacked.[33] Second, anticipatory self- defense is
grounded in customary international law that provides no clear guidelines for its use.[34] In the restrictivist view, the
conditions in which such law may be relied upon are too vague to be of much help for the decisionmaker. This
philosophy represents the minority view.
Expansivist School. The predominant view, to which the United States subscribes,[35] has been termed by one

commentator as the "Expansive School."[36] Those who hold this view advocate that Article 51 permits anticipatory
self-defense in response to an imminent armed attack.
Expansivists argue that the restrictive view is a marked departure from the customary international law and that such a
departure should not be lightly presumed. They believe that since Article 51 does not unequivocally limit the right of
self-defense, it should not be construed as eliminating the customary law right to use military force against a
threatened attack.[37]
One advocate for the expansive reading of Article 51 states: "It would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to
compel a defending state to allow its assailant to deliver the first, and perhaps fatal, blow. . . . To read Article 51
otherwise is to protect the aggressor's right to the first strike."[38] This observation is particularly compelling in the era
of nuclear weapons and modern delivery systems. The destructive capability of modern weapons, and reduced reaction
times, pose a tremendous threat to the nonaggressor nation. As one commentator has put it, "No one could seriously
contend that any nation in the world should commit suicide by failing to prevent an imminent armed attack by its
enemies."[39]
Drafters Intent. The debates that took place during the drafting of the Charter suggest that there was no intent to
exclude anticipatory self-defense from the application of Article 51.[40] In a report issued before the adoption of the
Charter, the drafting committee said, "The use of arms in legitimate self-defense remains admitted and
unimpaired."[41] This language, which implies that the Committee intended to adopt the customary international law,
is consistent with the position that anticipatory self-defense is considered to fall within the intent of the Charter. There
is no clear indication that the drafters of the Charter intended any other result. Quite the contrary, the practice of most
member states since the Charter was adopted has been to recognize acts of anticipatory self-defense as legitimate.[42]
The Effect of Security Council Actions on the Right to Self-Defense
Article 51 requires member states to immediately report to the Security Council any measures taken in self-defense.
These reporting requirements are intended to provide the Security Council with notice of the events surrounding the
use of force.[43] Once defensive military actions are reported by a member state, the Security Council is charged with
determining and implementing the measures designed to restore the international peace. What happens to a nation's
right to continue to act in self-defense once the Security Council has taken action? Two opposing views are advanced
in the literature.
One point of view holds that the Security Council has plenary authority in this area and that its actions preclude further
self-defense measures. Advocates of this position believe the right of self-defense may be exercised only before the
United Nations takes action.[44] They argue it would be inconsistent with the creation of international order to allow
nations to invoke Article 51 after the Security Council has decided what measures are necessary to end the conflict.
The opposing position is that Security Council actions do not prevent continued self-defense measures if those actions
have not had the necessary effect of halting acts of aggression.[45] One commentator argues it would be absurd to
conclude that Security Council action terminated the right to engage in self-defense activities.[46] He reasons that
Security Council action cannot be intended to deprive a state its right to defend itself when the invader has not
complied with the Council's order.[47]
It is tempting to claim that the root issue in this debate concerns who decides whether the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. This issue is, in reality, just food for academic
thought. It would be a rare case when a state would cease defending itself and place its fate totally in the hands of a
third party (the United Nations). This is particularly true when one considers the limited success rate of the United
Nations. As a practical matter, each party--the Security Council and the defending state--must make its own
determination of the effectiveness of the UN measures. Should the individual state reach a conclusion different from
the Security Council, it will continue its military response as it deems appropriate. The defending state, however, runs
the risk of being declared the aggressor by the Security Council. Such a finding would subject the defending state to
sanctions or enforcement actions.
While the United Nations Charter does not specifically recognize this parallel decisionmaking process, the interests of

all parties are well served by it. The defending state is allowed to take the actions it believes are necessary for its own
defense.[48] At the same time, the international community is permitted to review that decision under the necessity and
proportionality criteria and impose sanctions if necessary.[49]
Collective Self-Defense
The Charter in general, and Article 51 in particular, adopt the customary international right of collective self-defense.
To constitute a legitimate exercise of collective self-defense, all conditions for the exercise of individual self-defense
must be met with one additional requirement.[50] The defending state must have declared itself the victim of an armed
attack and requested assistance.[51] Further, there is no recognized right of a third-party state to intervene in internal
conflicts where the issue in question is one of a group's right of self-determination.[52] Finally, treaties alone do not
provide adequate justification for a third-party state to intervene.[53] There must be an independent, underlying legal
justification that meets the requirements of self-defense. [54]
Self-Defense Criteria
Questions concerning whether a nation is entitled to act in self- defense often spring from an ambiguous
conglomeration of facts. While it is difficult to create a model that will resolve all issues in all cases, it is useful to
have some method for analyzing differing fact patterns. The following questions are offered as a basis for evaluating
the legitimacy of the use of military force in self-defense.[55] Accompanying each question is a brief discussion of its
significance to the analysis.
1. Is the proposed response aimed at protecting the status quo? Actions in self-defense, like those taken in the Gulf
War, are preventive in nature. Actions that have retribution as the objective are not self-defense and are aggressive in
nature.
2. Has there been a violation of a legal obligation? Each member state of the United Nations is obligated by Article
2(4) to refrain from using force or threats of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.
Threats to either of these fundamental values would violate that legal duty. Some commentators have included threats
to citizens, with a concurrent failure, or inability, of the host government to afford protection, as sufficient grounds for
invoking Article 51 self-defense rights. The United States has adopted this position. This policy may be seen in the US
actions taken in the failed attempt to rescue US hostages in Iran (1981), as well as in the successful operations in
Grenada (1982) and Panama (1989).
3. Has there been an actual armed attack from an external source? As distinguished from anticipatory self-defense,
which will be discussed later, the clearest case for self-defense arises when one state has been subjected to armed
attack by another state or an organization sponsored by another state. Article 2(7) cautions that entities internal to the
state are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Security Council and are not governed by Article 51.
4. Is the response, or proposed response, timely? Actions in self-defense must not be remote in time from the initial
aggression. A delayed response may be seen by the international community as a threat to international peace and
security. The need for immediacy (necessity) of action is lost if too much time lapses between the initial overt act of
aggression and the defensive reaction.
5. Is the military response in self-defense necessary? Article 2(3) of the Charter cautions all member states to resolve
their disputes by peaceful means. Article 33 requires parties to a dispute to refer it to the Security Council should they
fail in its resolution. Before military force may be used in self- defense, the threatened state is required to attempt all
practicable, peaceful means to resolve the dispute. If there is a realistic, meaningful alternative to military action, selfdefense is not available. There is, however, no requirement to exhaust all peaceful means if it would be fruitless to do
so. If, however, the need for military action is not clear, it is not justified.
6. Is the military response in self-defense proportionate to the threat? A nation acting in self-defense may use force no
greater than that needed to halt the danger posed by an aggressor nation. The response must be proportional in terms of
both the nature and the amount of force employed to repel the attack. An excessive response may be viewed by the
Security Council as an aggressive action and subject the defending nation to sanctions or enforcement actions.

7. Has any military response been immediately reported to the Security Council? Article 51 requires military actions
taken in self-defense to be immediately reported to the Security Council. This permits the Security Council to take the
actions it deems appropriate to restore international peace and security. The failure to report such actions quickly may
create the impression that the defending state lacks conviction that its actions were lawful. Further, quick notification
of the Security Council allows a more rapid response aimed at terminating the armed aggression.
8. Has the Security Council taken meaningful, effective measures to stop the aggressive conduct? Once the Security
Council takes effective action to end the aggressive acts of a state, the target state must cease its self-defense activities.
The failure to do so will be viewed as an aggressive act itself. Each nation must decide for itself whether the acts of the
Security Council are sufficient to restore international peace and security. Should a nation acting in self-defense decide
the UN actions are insufficient, it may continue to act in its own self-defense. That nation, however, runs the risk of
the international community reaching a different conclusion and imposing sanctions.
Anticipatory Self-Defense
The circumstances for acting in anticipatory self-defense are the same as those for self-defense except that an actual
armed attack has not yet occurred. They often arise in situations involving state-supported terrorism, such as when the
United States found it necessary to attack Libya in 1986. The conduct of a nation engaging in preemptive actions will
be reviewed against the totality of the circumstances existing at the time the decision to take action was made. In other
words, the reasonableness of the conduct will be examined. The key question is this: Is there an imminent or
immediate threat of an armed attack? In determining whether an attack is imminent, justifying preemptive action,
several factors should be considered:
Are there objective indicators that an attack is imminent? Factors such as troop buildups, increased alert levels,
increased training tempo, and reserve call-ups may suggest that an attack is imminent.
Does the past conduct or hostile declarations of the alleged aggressor reasonably lead to a conclusion that an attack
is probable? A pattern of aggressive past conduct or hostile public statements may demonstrate an intention by an
aggressor nation to launch an armed attack.
What is the nature of the weapons available to the alleged aggressor nation, and does it have the ability to use them
effectively? Weapons of mass destruction and modern delivery systems make waiting for an actual armed attack
exceedingly dangerous. While possession of such weapons alone is not indicative of an intent to use them, it is a factor
that must be considered with all other relevant factors.
Is the use of force the last resort after exhausting all practicable, peaceful means? Unlike actions in self-defense
following an armed attack, preemptive actions generally mean some time is available for peaceful resolution. There
will be closer scrutiny of the efforts made to resolve a dispute when a nation acts in a preemptive manner. The failure
to exhaust practicable remedies may result in sanctions for aggressive conduct.
Collective Self-Defense
One additional criterion exists when collective self-defense is contemplated:
Has the target state requested assistance? Without such a request, as was made by Kuwait in 1990, a third-party
nation will be seen as having improperly intervened in the situation. This intervention may be seen as an aggressive
act justifying the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations.
Self-Defense Criteria Applied
Returning to the missile attack on Iraq described in the introduction, how would the United States claim of selfdefense fare when compared against the proposed criteria? A review of the criteria demonstrates that this claim, which
on its face has a certain appeal, falls short of requirements for properly invoking Article 51. Each element is briefly
reviewed below.

1. Was the response aimed at protecting the status quo? With the alleged attack occurring in April and the response
conducted in June, it is difficult to conclude that the actions of the United States were preventive in nature. The
attempted attack had already been averted when the Kuwaiti government exposed the plot and arrested those involved.
2. Was there a violation of a legal obligation? If the conclusion by the United States that the assassination attempt
against former President Bush was ordered by the Iraqi government is correct, there has been a violation of a legal
obligation. Iraq is required to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of the United States. These
rights, absent a state of war, are infringed when a political leader is identified for assassination by a foreign
government.
3. Was there an actual attack? A state-directed assassination attempt against a former President may properly be seen
as an attack against the United States and its sovereignty. Such an attempt was not merely a random act, but a
carefully designed plot to punish President Bush for his actions in executing his office as the head of the United States
government.
4. Was the response timely? This criterion represents one of the biggest obstacles to the US claim of self-defense
under Article 51. More than two months passed from the date the assassination attempt was exposed to the date
military action was taken. During this time the United States conducted an investigation to determine who was behind
the plot. Only upon satisfying itself as to its origins did the United States respond militarily. The need for immediacy
of action, however, is difficult to support after the passage of more than two months. No current or imminent attack
was being thwarted by the US actions.
5. Was the military response necessary? This requirement also poses some difficulty for the US claim of self-defense.
No attempt was made to resolve this issue through peaceful means. With the passage of time the need for a military
response became more and more remote. It cannot be determined whether further UN sanctions or enforcement actions
would have been futile, because that option does not appear to have been explored.
6. Was the response proportionate? The attack was aimed at the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the
organization identified as being behind the assassination plot. Collateral damage was minimized. Twenty-three cruise
missiles were fired with the resultant loss of life limited to six people. The requirement for a proportionate response
appears to have been met by its restrictive nature and limited collateral damage.
7. Was the action immediately reported to the Security Council? This criterion was also met. The United States
requested a special meeting of the Security Council for the next day. At that meeting the United States advised the
Security Council of the actions it had taken and the reasons therefor.
8. Did the Security Council take meaningful, effective measures to stop the aggressive conduct? The Security Council
only learned of the actions after they had taken place. The United States did not request any formal statement or
resolution approving its actions. As the military response by the United States had been completed, there was little for
the Security Council to do.
Perhaps the more plausible claim of self-defense available to the United States is that it was acting to preempt future
attacks by Iraq against the national interests of the United States. This argument, however, is not without its problems.
The United States did not demonstrate that an imminent threat of armed attack existed at the time military actions took
place in June. There were, however, several factors that would have supported this claim. First, public declarations by
Iraqi government officials indicated an intent to take action against a former US President. Their actions in April
clearly indicated an intent to take steps to carry out those threats. Further, as a nation identified as supporting
terrorism, Iraq has demonstrated a willingness and an ability to use those tactics against the interests of the United
States.
The difficulty the United States has in sustaining a claim of anticipatory self-defense is that it has not pointed to any
evidence that Iraq was planning any further attempts against the United States. It is difficult, therefore, to conclude that
the missile attack in June 1993 preempted any aggressive actions by Iraq.
In matching the response of the United States against the proposed criteria, a claim of the need to act in self-defense

under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter lacks substance. In pressing its claim of self-defense before the United
Nations, the United States was no doubt aided by a general lack of respect by the world community for Saddam
Hussein and Iraq. Little criticism was leveled at the United States for the actions it took. This lack of criticism resulted
not so much from a consensus that the actions of the United States were a legitimate exercise of the right to act in selfdefense but rather from a general disapproval of the Iraqi government.
Conclusion
The use of military force in national self-defense is a right long recognized by the international community. Under
customary international law nations are permitted to act in self-defense if there is a need to do so and the extent of the
military response is not disproportionate to the threat. With the establishment of the United Nations, whose goal is to
establish a world order aimed at maintaining international peace and security, the extent of a nation's right to act in
self-defense is less clear.
Considerable controversy surrounds the ability of a nation to take preemptive action to defend against a perceived
imminent threat or to continue its defensive efforts after the Security Council has taken measures aimed at ending the
hostilities. Most scholars support the right of nations to take these actions in their own defense. Those in the minority,
however, make many valid points in arguing that such conduct is contrary to the purposes of the United Nations and
undermines the authority of the Security Council. The extent of the right to act in self-defense is not always clear, and
considerable debate continues over these issues.
The criteria above are offered to assist in the analysis of whether the legal right to act in self-defense has accrued.
They are intended as a guide for policymakers in reviewing a particular set of circumstances and making informed
decisions concerning an appropriate course of conduct.
Even the best analysis may be overcome by the politics of the situation. In the case of the attack on the Iraqi
Intelligence Headquarters, the argument that the actions of the United States conformed with the requirements of
Article 51 appears to be insupportable by the facts. The despicable actions of Saddam Hussein and his government,
however, allowed the United States to take this action without fear of being chastised by the international community.
In any particular set of circumstances, it is the reasonableness of the actions taken by a nation which will be the key
factor in appraising whether defensive actions are justified. It is on this basis that the international community will
ultimately judge a nation's conduct.
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